Second Nature and Recognition: Hegel and the Social Space1 Italo Testa Translated by G. Donis AhstracI: In this articIe I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of "second nature" and "recognition". To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper ro the theory ofHegelian and post-Hegelian Ane/'kennttng. 1he solution strategy I propose is signilìcant also in terms ofbringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of "space of reasons" that sterns from the Hegelian concept of "Spirit". I thus broach the notion of "second nature" as a bridgeconcept that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Ane/'kenntlng and for a rethinking of the "space of reasons" within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the noveltics introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between lìrst and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levds. I then retum lo the qucstion of the space of reasons to show the contribution the renewed conception of recognition as second nature makcs lo the definition of its intrinsic sociality as something that is not in principle opposed to a sense of naturalncss. Keywords: recognition, second nature, Hegel, Brandom, McDowell 1. Introduction: the background of the question The aim of this paper is to bring into focus the notions of second nature and recognition (Anerkennung) in their reciproca! connection, both historically and theoretically. Let me begin, then, by outlining some premises for the discourse I wish to develop here. l. Previous dralts and parts of this paper were presented at the 14th Interoational Colloquium Evian, "What is Second Nature? Rcason, Hislory, Institutions" (13-19 July 2008) and at the Joint International Conferencc of the Soeicry for Europeali Philosophy and of the Forum For European Philosophy, University of Sussex (8-10 September 2007). I would like to thank ali the partieipalIIS for their hclpful comments. I am also grateful to an allOnymous referee for his/her vcry valuable alid heipful comments on thc papero CriticaI Horizom: A Jotlmal 01 PIJi/osophy t/ud Sociallbeory 10(3), December 2009, 341-70 © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 342 ITALO TESTA 1.1 Recognition revisited A generaI objective of my study consists in elaborating a renewed vision of the theory of Anerkennung by broaching a distinction between two levels of recognition. 1.1.1 A problem in the theory of recognition The broaching of this distinction is justified by the need to solve a problem that emerges in the theory of recognition, which we can illustrate by clarif}ring two sides of a dilemma connected with it: • Circularity: recognition appears to presuppose itself. A version of this problem is the one originally noted by Fichte and later reproposed by Dieter Henrich,2 for which if reRexive self-consciousness constitutes itself through the process of recognition then to recognize reRexively I must already have a pre-reRexive familiarity with myself. 3 Thus the recognitive theory of self-consciousness, to avoid falling into a vicious circle, apparently ought to renounce explanation of the self-referential structure of self-consciousness and admit the primitivity of a notion of subjective self-reference of a prereRexive type.4 • 1he insufficiency 01 comtl'Uctivism: the constructivist models of recognition assume that recognition be a question of attribution, such that the status of 2. See D. Henrich, "SelbstbewuBtsein: kritische Einleitung in eine Theoric", in Hermelleutik ,md Dil1lektik, I, R. Bubncr (cd.), 257-84 (Tubingcn: Mohr, 1979) and "Noch einmal in Zirkcln. Eine Kritik van Ernst Tugcndhats semantischcr Erkliirung van Sclbstbewusstsein", in Mensch Imd Modeme, C. Bel/ut & U. Miillcr-Scuhll (eds), 93-132 (Wurzburg: K6nigshausen & Neumann, 1989). 3. 1he German word Reflexioll indicates in Hegel the logica! structuce of self-reference. Thc tcnn is applied by Hegel to natural proeesses that for an external obscrvcr cxhibit a form of self-referenee; at a higher lcve! it is applied to eonsciousness, llnderstood as inunediate Reflexion (sce G. W. F. Hcgcl, EnzykloPiidie der philosophischen Wissenschl1ften illl GNU/drisse, W. Bonsiepen & H.-C. Lucas [cds] [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, [1830]1992], published in English as Hege" Philosophy ofMillti, W. Wallaee & A. V. Miller [trans.] [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971], hereatter Enz.: §413), a ferm of self-refercncc accompanied in itsclf by some type of awarcness of ohjects; and to selfeonsciollsness, understood asgedoppelte Reflexioll (see G. W. F. Hegcl, Phiillolllenologiedes Geistes, W. Bonsiepen & R. Heede [eds], in Gesl1llllllelte W.rke, voI. 9 [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1980], pllblished in English as Hegeli PhenolllenologyofSpirit, A. V. Miller [trans.] [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977], hereatter PhdG: 108), a form of self-referenee aeeompanied for itselfby self-awareness: henee as Reflexioll that makes itself cxplicit. Howcvcr, whcn wc spcak in our text of"pre-rcHcxive familiarity" and "reHexive sclf-consciousness" wc are using the English tcrm "reflexivc)) in a diffcrent sensc from Hegcl's use of the word Reflexion and its adjeetive reflektiert, inrueating with "pre-rellexivc" a form of self-rcfcrcnce that functions spontaneously without being accompanied by self-awarcncss, and with "reflcxivc)) a form of self-rcfcrcnce that is accompanied by self-awareness. Note that for Hegel both these forms of experienee exhibit at different levels thc logical structure of what he ealls Rejlexioll, a term best cx:prcssed in English by tlle noun "reflection" and its adjective "reHcctivc)). 4. See M. Frank. "Wider den aprioristischen Intcrsubjektivismus", in Gemeinschaft tmd Gerechtigkeit. M. Brwnlik & H. Brunkhorst (eds), 273-89 (Frankfurt: Fiseher, 1993). © Acwnen Publishing L,d. 2009 SECONO NATURE ANO RECOGNITION: HEGEL ANO THE SOCIAL SPACE 343 what is recognized depends for its being so on the attitudes of the attributor who recognizes this status. lf the theory of recognition has to explain the structure of self-consciousness, then it tums out that the properry of being self-conscious is itself a status that depends for its existence on the fact ofbeing recognized through attribution.5 But a pragmatics of recognition resolved in terms of reciprocal attributions of status is faced with the problem that the act of attributing seems to presuppose the capacity of performing acts of attribution in he who performs it. Such a capacity canno t, in its tu m, simply be the product of an attribution but must in some way pre-exist as a property of the individuaI who exercises it, otherwise this individuaI would never be capable ofbeginning and performing even the slightest act of attribution. lf, then again, this presupposed capacity were identical with the fuHy developed capacity of performing acts of recognitive attribution understood as that through which self-conscious knowing constitutes itself then the theory of recognition would explain nothing, because it would end up presupposing that which it ought to explain. 1.1.2 Proposal for a theoretical solution of the problem One way of getting out of this impasse, responding to the problem of circularity without, however, falling into a subjectivist theory, consists in my view in admitting the existence of two levels of recognition a proposition that can also be justified empirically:6 namely, an intrinsically pre-reflexive level, connected with natural functions of identification, and a spirituallevel that develops in the process of formation (Bildung) through which the natural functions are reshaped as second-order capacities. This second-order level can become reflexive, despite its necessarily being connected for its functioning to the pursuit of a pre-reflexive form of habitual automatismo Thus the fact that the reflexive recognition of selfconsciousness presupposes a primitive form of pre-reflexivity does not mean that we have to abandon the theory of recognition in favour of a subjectively oriented theory, since such a capacity of pre-reflexive self-reference can in its tum be explained in terms of pre-reflexive recognitive capacities that are activated in the natural interaction between living beings. 5. See R. B. Pippin, "What is the Quesdon for which Hegel's Thcory ofRecognition is the Answcr?" EllropeanfoltmalofPhi/osophy 8(2) (2000), 155-72. 6. Scc L Testa, "Riconoscimento naturalizzato: Una soluzione scettica al dibattito sull'autocoscienza tra Henrich, Tugcndhat e Habermas" J in Ragionevoli dubbi. La critica sociale tra tmiversalismo e scepsi, p. Costa, M. Rosati & I. Testa (eds), 67-90 (Rome: Carocci, 2001) and "Naturalmente sociali: Per una teoda generale del riconoscimento", in Rege! e le scienze sociali, A. Bellan & L Testa (eds), Quaderni di Teoria Sociale 8 (2005), 165-218. © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 344 ITALO TESTA 1.1.3 Historical justification and hermeneutical advantages of the theoretical mode! This theoretical mode! for a solution to the problem of the theory of recognition also enjoys historical supporto In my view it can in fact be shown that in Hege!'s pre-phenomenological writings a distinction is at work between two leve!s of recognition - "natutal recognition" and "spiritual recognition" that operate according to the logic we have illustrated with reference to our theoretical mode!.7 In light of this interpretation of the Jena writings it is possible, then, also to propose an unprecedented reading of the theory of "Self-consciousness" in the Phenomenology. In the transition from Begierde understood as appetite or instinctive desire (see Enz. §426) to perfected se!f-consdousness, in facr, Hegel appears to presuppose a theoretical acquisition of his previous writings, setting out with a new language the ever problematic process of integration between the two leve!s of recognition. And in this respect the revisited theory of recognition, based on the dialectical relation between the two levels, appears able to make a theoretical contribution also to the definition of the conceptual bases of the notion of Kampf um Anerkennung that Axe! Honneth views as centraI to the task of a reappropriation ofHegel's legacy within contemporary so dal philosophy.8 1.2 Understanding the ''space ofreasons" Now that I have sketched the general theoretical background for the question I intend to tackIe, I want to give a preliminary idea of how this question is connected with a broader theme. A spedfic objective of this paper, in fact, is that of contributing to an adequate understanding of the notion of "space of reasons". Many of us today find this formula of Sellars's to be an interesting point of departure for a reappropriation of some fruitful motifs of the Hege!ian notion of reason within the contemporary constellation. 1.2.1 A problem in the theory of the space of reasons It is also true, however, that current interpretations of the space of reasons have drawbacks that continue to render them unsatisfactory with respect to the desiderata that the Hegelian notion of spirit appears to pose for an adequate notion 7. For • detailed exposition of this reading of the pre-phenorncnological writings sec I. Test •• Riconoscimento naturale e autocoscienza sociale: Ricostruzione e ripresa della teoria hegeliallll dell/burkenmmg. dissertatiOII, Università Ca' Foscad, Venice (2002), reprinted as Riconoscimento lIatllrale e mondo sociale (Milan: Guerini, 2009) and Testa (2008111). 8. Sce A. Honneth, Kampfum Anerkenlllmg: ZlIr mora/ischen Grammatik sozia/er KonJlikte (Frankfurt: Suhrkanlp, 1992), published in English as The Struggle fol' Recognition: 7"e Moral Graml1lar ofSoeial COllflicts, J. Anderson (trans.) (Cambridge: Polity Presso 1995). © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 SECOND NATURE AND RECOGNITION: HEGEL AND THE SOCIAL SPACE 345 of reason. In this regard we find a theoretical bifurcation that is emblematically expresscd by the positions ofJohn McDowell and Robel't Bl'andom. The bifurcation assumes the following form: • McDowellspace ofreasons with nature butwithout social recognition. On one hand McDowell wants to convince us that we are not obliged to understand the logical space of reasons as opposed to the logical space of nature, as long as we admit that the latter be broader than the realm oflaws proper to modem sdence.9 In this respect for McDowell it is possible to recondle the normativity of reason with naturalness in so far as we are willing to make room for an extended conception of nature and to re-include the Aristote!ian and Hegelian notion of second nature within it. Reason can thus be understood as the individual's second nature in so far as it consists in a cenain type of reactivity to the environment a disposition to react to reasons that organizes our natural way of being. However, this re-naturalization of the space of reasons do es not imply its sodalization. In fact this move is combined in McDowcll with a Platonist and anti-constructivist option, on the basis of which the normative structure both of se!f-consdousness and of the space of reasons cannot in its tum be explained on the basis of so dal interactions of a recognitive type but is, so to speak, presupposed to them as some son of irresolvable givenness. lO McDowell's position thus appears unsatisfactory with respect to the desiderata posited both by the Hege!ian theory of Anerkennung and by the Hegelian conception of second nature, which does not regard subjective spirit alone, as in McDowell, but objective spirit as well: that is, the second nature of sodal institutions. • BrantWm: space ofreasons with social recognition butwithout nature. Brandom's conception of the space of reasons accounts for its sodal structure in so far as he explains the form and the content of rational normativity as the product of recognitive interactions between individuals. But then again, at least in the first phase of his interpretation of Hegel, Il Brandom elaborated a mode! of recognition in terms of a normative pragmatics of attribution that appears to le ad to a form of so dal constructivism little inclined to account for the connection between the recognitive attitudcs and natural capadties of individuals. In this respect Brandom's theory of recognition appears 9. See J. McDowell, Mi1ld a1ld World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universiry Press, 1994; 2nd edo, 1996). lO. See J. McDowell, "Sclbstbestimmende Subjektivitat und externer Zwang", in Hegels Erbe, C. Halbig, M. Quante & L. Siep (eds), 184-208 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004). Il. See R B. Beandom, "Some Pragmatist Thcmcs in Hegcl's Idealistn: Negotiation andAdministration in Hegcl's Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms", Europea1l lo/muti of Philosophy 7(2) (1999), 164-89, reprinted in his Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics ofI1Ilenti01lality, 210-34 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universiry Press, 2002). © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 346 ITALO TESTA to move mainly within the so dal dimension of objective spirit and of its logical relation with absolute spirit, without accounting for the Hegelian connection between subjective spirit and objective spirit, individuai capadties and sodal construction. Then again, Brandom has expressed himself a number of times in favour an interpretation of the space of reasons, which presupposes a clear-cut discontinuity between nature and sodal normativity and which appears to be unsatisfàctory with respect to Hegel's demand to go beyond all the dualisms that paralyse thought. 1.2.2 Strategy for a solution of the problem My own point of depatture is that an adequate conception of the space of reasons, to be faithful to the phenomenon it describes and also to satisfY the desiderata of the Hegelian conception, would have to dissolve the bifurcation illustrated above and thus account for both the intrinsic sodality of its normative structure and for the fact that this normative space must not be conceived in opposition to the space of nature. 12 Here, the most promising strategy to dissolve the bifurcation appears to consist in developing a conception that connects the theory of recognition and the theory of second nature on a new basis, thus making it possible to arrive at a conception of second nature broader than the merely subjectivistic one developed by McDowell and, at the same time, at a conception of recognition that is thicker than the objectivistic one developed by Brandom. 2. The theory of second nature as a bridge between the two problems Having placed our spedfic objective of understanding the sodal space of reasons against the generai background of the question of recognition revisited, we can now come to grips with the theme of the relation between second nature and recognition. In fact, the solution to the problem of how to conceive of a space of reasons that is understood both as sodal and in second-nature terms, and the solution to the problem of the theory or ili recognition, appear at this point to pass through the same door. Thus the conception of recognition as an interweaving of two levels natural recognition and spiritual recognition predsely in so far as it can be read in relation to the question of the relation between first and second nature, can make a contribution to the task of thinking the sodality of the space of reasons. 12. For an illuminating account, directed towards a differcnt end, of the dialectical relation bctwccn Brandom and McOowell, see D. Macbeth. "Un'antinomia nel giudizio empirico: Brandom e McDowell", in Lo spazio sociale della ragiolle, L. Ruggiu & I. Testa (cds) (Milan: Guerini, 2008). © Acwnen Publishing Ltd. 2009 SECONO NATURE ANO RECOGNITION: HEGEL ANO TBE SOCIAL SPACE 347 Hence the theory of second nature appears able to play a key tole in this strategy. To be able to deve!op an adequate conception of recognition and, together, of the space of reasons, it thus appears necessary: • to formulate a theory of second nature c1early and coherently; • to present a renewed vision of the theory of recognition in Iight of the theory of second nature. Both these tasks are stili far from having found satisfactory fulfilment. In the first pIace no fully fledged theory of second nature exists, and also the references to this concept to be found in McDowel! and in the authors who have followed him are altogether fragmentary and Iimited for the most part to references to the authority of Aristotle or of Hegel. In the second pIace a mode! of recognition in the Iight of second nature has yet to be achieved: while its idea may have been sketched, its systematic form remains to be defined. 2.1 Historical justification and he/'meneutical advantages 01 the theo/'etical model The unsatisfactory character of the conception of second nature circulating in contemporary philosophy of Hegelian inspiration is due, moreover, to the fact that such philosophy Iimits itself to taking up this or that aspect of the concept unilaterally, unconcerned with shedding Iight on its theoretical consistency, or on its historical development, or on the comprehensive form it assumes in Hegel's thought. It appears, then, that access to a theory of second nature must be prepared through: (i) an analysis of the concept's structure (§3.1.1); (ii) a historical overview of the concepts regarding the lexical deve!opment of the expression (§3.1.2); (iii) an overview of some aspects of the evolution of this notion within the history of thought (§3.1.3); (iv) a systematic interpretation of the implicit and explicit role the concept plays in the evolutive history ofHege!'s philosophy (§3.1.4); (v) an overview of the textual passages in which the notion recurs in Hegel's texts (§3.1.5). The task of reconstructing the Hegelian conception of second nature and of making its conceptual role explicit is not, however, an end in itselfbut, from my perspective, makes both a historiographic and a theoretical contribution to the theory of recognition. In fact it is possible, in my view, to recover traces of the connections between the two problematics both in the lexical structure of the two concepts and in the pre-Hegelian history of the concept of second nature. © Acumen Publishing L,d. 2009 348 ITALO TESTA Furthermore, the very evolution of Hege!'s thought from the writings of his youth to those of his maturity reveals a strict connection between the problematic of second nature and that of Anerkennung. This connection can be stated in the form of the following argument: • argument of the second-nature embodiment of recognition: recognition can be "real" for Hegel only if it is objectified in a second nature that is both subjective and objective (§3.3). 1his argument can then be justified (§3.3.1) through an articulate interpretation of the "Se!f-consdousness" section of the Phenomenology and then (§3.3.2) through an interpretation of the systematic connection between this text and the section of the Encyclopaedia in which Hege! deve!ops the theory of second nature as habit. Since this second aspect is strategie in the deve!opment of our theme, our attention will be prevalently focused on it. At the end of our investigation we shall attempt to see what conclusions can be drawn from ali this for the question of the understanding of sodal space. To this end we shall show that the argument of embodiment is in the final analysis the keystone for arriving at a conception of second nature that is broader than McDowell's which is limited to internai second nature and, at the same ti me, thicker than Brandorns, whose first mode! of recognition privileges the leve! of spiritual recognition and appears incapable of rooting such recognition in individuai capadties (i.e. in subjective spirit). 3. Second nature and recognition 3.1 On the theory ofsecond nature 3.1.1 Structure of the concept: spheres of reference The expression "second nature" (natura altera, secunda natura, zweite Natur, seconda natura, deuxième nature) is typically used as a predicate, to qualifY something, rather than as a noun: thus one says of something that it is second nature, rather than defining second nature as thus and SO.13 Accordingly, in the history of thought habits, customs, characters, the virtues proper to human individuals or determinate forms of life (Bi/dung, technicality, ethical life, culture, Right, the State) have been characterized as second nature. We can thus distinguish two prindpal spheres ro which the notion can refer, name!y: 13. See N. Rath, Zweite Nattlr: KOllzepte eiller Vermittlrmg VOli Natllr Imd Kllitur ili Antropologie Imd Jisthetik tIlll1800 (Miinster: Waxmann, 19%), 121. © Acwnen Publishing L,d. 2009 SECOND NATURE AND RECOGNITION: HEGEL AND THE SOCIAI. SPACE 349 • subjective; • objective. The fÌrst case refers to an individual's dispositions, capacities and attitudes qualifÌed as second nature, while the second refers to forms of Iife, sodai relations and institutions. On this basis we may operate a further distinction between: • internaI second nature; • externaI second nature. 14 Here, the fÌrst case refers to the internai constitution ofindividuaIs, of the way in which they are made, as the result of a process of development and construction that nonetheless does not prevent them from acting with a spontaneity anaIogous to that of the simpIy instinctuaI and genetically programmed fÌrst-nature processes; while the second case refers to externaI nature understood as an ensembie of the forms of objectifÌed interactions together with the institutions of the sodai space in which individuaIs fÌnd themselves operating, presenting an immediacy anaIogous to that of the fÌrst-nature environment. In the history of the notion of second nature the fÌrst of the two senses has elearly been prevalent, at Ieast up to the conceptuaI operation performed by Hegel, who as we shall attempt to show makes room for both senses and systematically unifÌes them in a diaIecticaI conception. Misunderstanding of this decisive aspect of the Hegelian appropriation of second nature determines the peculiarly unilateraI character of the current interpretations, which end up by concentrating exelusively on individuaI internai second nature, as in McDowell's case, and thus Iosing sight of the notion's sodo-diaiecticaI profile, or else on externaI second nature, insisting on the institutionai and objective character of second nature qua ethicaIlife, but ending up by Iosing its anchorage in individuaI capadties and in the causai powers connected with them.15 3.1.1.1. Fi/'St and second nature. The notion of second nature is delimited, then, by contrast with respect to a correlative notion of"fÌrst nature", often not expliddy defÌned and taken as obvious, but which indicates, at various times: merely animai fÌrst nature versus the second nature of man as a culturaI animai; the fÌrst 14. On this distinction, and for a detailcd critique ofMcDowell in this rcspect see I. Testa, "Criticism from within Nature: The Dialectic betwcen First and Second Nature from McDowell to Adorno") Philosophy and Social Criticism 33(3) (2007),473-97. 15. Robert Pippin's institutional conception of the Hegelian notion of freedom is typical of the second rurection (see R. B. Pippin, "Hegel c la razionalità istituzionale" J in Hegel contemportlneo: La ricezione amel'ica di Hegel a confiomo COli la tradiziolle ellropea, L. Ruggiu & I. Testa [eds], 97-128 [Milan: Guerini, 2003]). © Acumen Publishing L,d. 2009 350 ITALOTESTA nature of merely causal processes versus the second nature of rational processes; in a broader interpretation, the first nature of objectified processes that have to be made intelligible in so far as they are subjected to the mere nomological nature of modern science (and that are hence considered methodologically as of themselves without meaning and normative connections) versus the second nature of the processes that come within the domain of normatively structured practical rationality.16 Beyond these various differences, that which constitutes the analogon of first in second nature, at least as far as internai second nature is concerned,appears for the most part to consist in the traits of vitality, animality, reactivity (disposition to react to environmental stimuli), and spontaneity (autokinesis). Thus for example external second nature, in the authors that theorize its existence,17 is understood for the most part as an inorganic nature, the result of a process of objectification that such philosophers as Hegel and Lukacs will see as petrification of ethicallife and congealment of spirito 3.1.2 Some aspects of the lexical deve/opment The lexical history of the expression "second nature" is warthy of our attention, far its wealth of implications both in general and in reference to our specific theme. 18 Democritus, for instance, maintained in one of his fragments (DK 68 B 33) that education was similar to nature: just as nature has productive Force the capacity of changing something so education has the capacity of changing man, producing a new nature (physiopoiei) in him. Democritus, then, saw habit as something that, while the product of an educative mediation, nonetheless acts in the individual with the irreflexive immediacy, authority, causal power and necessity of nature. Democritus, however, did not use the term etera physis (other nature), which we find only in Aristotle, to indicate the dyad from which for the Platonists ali numbers were produced (M et. A 6, 987b33): a linguistic use that neverthe/ess does not directly invest the phenomenon of ethical hexis of the moral disposition acquired through educative deve/opment and the habitual stabilization of natural functions which is the full and proper domain of reference of internal second nature. With Cicero the naturalness of habit already 16. The fÌrst interpretation of second nature as the logica! space of causality is to be found, for examplc. in H.bermas (see J. H.bermas, Wtthrheit tlnd Rechtfèrtiglmg: Philosophische Atlfiiitze [Frankfurt: Suhrk.mp, 1999], 32ff.; .nd Zwischen Nllttlnt/is",,,, .md Religion: Philosophische Atlfiiitze [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005], 155ff.). McDowell, by contrast, speaks out .gainst me identification between me logical space of natural science (and thus of the first-nature objects mat fall within it) and me logica! space of causality; he understands first nature as simply me dom:tin of lcgality, that is, as nomological nature, not exclllding that me notion of causality can regard also me logica! space of sccond nature (see McDowell, Mind IInd World, XVIII ili, 70-73). 17. Sce ibid., 84. 18. On mis histoty see G. Funke, "Natur, zweite (1)", in Historisches Worterbtlch der Philosophie, voI. 6, 484-9 (Basel: Schw.be, 1984). © Acumen Publishing L,d. 2009 SECOND NATURE AND RECOGNITION: HEGELAND THE SOCIAL SPACE 351 comes to be indicated as "natura altera (other nature)". This expression which will give rise to the rhetorical topos of consuetudo quasi natura altera (custom is second nature) is used by Cicero not only to refer to the habits of individuals but also in an objective sense, to indicate for example the natural environment modified by human intervention through agriculture (De natura deorum 2, 60, 52). Qualified by Galen as "acquired nature (Physis epiktetos)" (De motu musculorum 2, 7), it becomes with Augustine literally "secunda natura" (Contra Julianum 1, 69, 14) taking on a theological shading extraneous to the Greeks and the Latins, since habit is here understood as what links us to the bad second nature we have acquired after the Faii. This expression, along with "natura alia" and "natura altera", will then give rise to their equivalents in the principal modern languages. 3.1.3 An aspect of the idealistic history of the concept of second nature and of its interweaving with Anerkennung. Fichte and the pre-reflexive principles of reciprocal action The interweaving of second nature and the theory of recognition can begin ro be appreciated if we dwell on a particular moment of the fortune of second nature in classical German philosophy. In the philosophy of Fichte the author from whom Hegel will take up the theory of Anerkennung we in fact find a use of second nature as a category of social acting. Fichte writes in Die Griindzuge des gegenwiirtigen Zeitalters (1804) that: "Custom consists for us in the principles of reciprocal interaction between men, made habitual and come to be second nature through the entire stage of culture: principi es that thus do not wholly emerge in clear consciousness" .19 Second nature, designated with the term "andere Natul' in conformitywith the Latin "natura alia/natura altera" is understood here as ethical custom, individuai habit produced through the cultural process of education. Furthermore, this internai second nature is also understood on a par with the Aristotelian dispositions to friendship (philia) (Et. Nich. VI, 13, l144b9) as the form that certain individuai dispositions to social interaction assume. Ethical custom, precisely in so far as it becomes a second nature for the individuai, can in fact function as a "principle of reciprocal action" between meno Thus social interaction can be instituted and develop only in so far as it takes root in the dispositions of individuals as a second nature with which they are endowed. What is more, let us 19. "Sitte ... bedeutet uns ... die angewohnten und durch den ganzen Stand der Cultur zur anderen Natur gewordenen, und cbcndarum in deutlicher BewuBtseyn durchaus nicht vorkommenden Principien dec Wechselwirkung dcc Menschen untereinander" O. G. Fichtc, Die Grrmdziige des gegenwiirtige/l Zeitalters. in his Gesamtausgabe der Bayel'isclJeIl Akademie der Wissenschafien, voI. l, 8ill, R. Lauth & H. Gliwitzky [cds), 189-396 [Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, (1804) 1991]' 365). © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 352 ITALO TESTA note that the principles of social interaction that have the form of second nature for Fichte are such that they are not present in "clear consciousness" (deutliches Bewujtseyn). These, then, are principles that, while they can be made explicit, usually function while remaining outside the range of reflexive consciousness. Note that also the Fichtean use of the notion of second nature is predicative. Also, that to which second nature is referred is some rype of disposition that makes possible and coordinates the interaction between human individuals. With this we have reached the point that interests us: in fact, the disposition in question can most certainly be identified with the disposition to recognition. Fichte, in fact, in his lessons on the Bestimmung des Gelehrten (1794) was already asking himself how the concept of "sociery (Gesellschaft)" was possible the idea, that is, of a reciproca! relation between rational beings20 reaching the conclusion that this concept presupposes that a human being assume the disposition to "recognize (anerkennen)" that there are other rational beings besides himself. This, then, will be described in §§3--4 of the Grundlage des Naturrechts (17%) as a pre-reflexive disposition to react to the stimulus of the presence of others by activating a recognitive response - "recognizing", that is, "treating" such a stimulus as an "exhortation (Aufforderung)", an "invitation". This pre-reflexive disposition to recognize the "exhortation" of the other ism in Die Grudlage lQl, what exp!ains the very possibiliry of reflective practical self-consciousness and of freedom which would otherwise on!y presuppose itself and thus be endangered by circulariry (§3). Such a disposition, in Die Grundlage a!ready understood as something developed in the process of education, is what Fichte in the later Griindzuge des gegenwiirtigen Zeitalters (1804) will then sketchily understand as something that has to be made habitual as a custom and thus come to be second nature. 3.1.4 The Hegelian revo!ution: the explicit role of second nature in Hegel Hegel's theory of second nature remained in a fragmentary state, as, for that matter, did his theory of Anerkennung. Confronted with a variery of implicit and explicit uses of the notion of second nature, we find no textual passages in which Hegel deliberately collects the materia! accumulated in his various writings within the frame of a unitary theory. However, this does not mean that making reference principally to the exposition of the notion in Elements of the Philosophy of Right and in the Encyclopaedia we cannot reconstruct a profile of the Hegelian conception as having distinctive characteristics, marking a break with previous tradition. This operation is, on one hand, a contribution to the interpretation of Hegel; on the other, in so far as we attempt to delineate a full and proper theory, the interpretative reconstruction of the Hegelian conception 20. Scc J. G. Fichte, Dc affidis Eruditorum. Einigc Vorlesungcn ilber die Bestimmung des Gelehrtcn, in his Gesamtausgabc dcr Bayerischen Akadcmie der WisscnschaJten, voI. I, 3, ili, R. Lautb & H. Jacob [eds], 25-68 [Sruttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommaun-Holzboog, (1794) 1962]). © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 SECOND NATURE AND RECOGNITION: HEGEI. AND THE SOCIAI. SPACE 353 is carried out in light of the theoretical horizon of contemporary philosophy and thus of a possible systematic contribution of the Hegelian legacy to the solution of present-day dilemmas. Let us, then, preliminarily state the mai n characteristics of Hege!'s theory of second nature. This conception: • attributes to second nature the conceptual structure of "immediate mediation (unmittelbare Vermittlung)". Second naturalness is predicated of something that operates with an immediacy, irreflexiviry and spontaneity analogous to that of first-nature processes but that is neverthe!ess the product of a process of sodal and cultural mediation; • distinguishes and unifies two senses of second nature as subjective second nature (organic: analyscd in the Enryclopaedia) and objective second nature (inorganic: analysed in the Philosophy ofRight). Second nature thus regards the structure of Geist in that it embraces determinations both of subjective spirit and of objective spirit; • unites the andent interpretation of physis as autokinesis with the modern mechanistic interpretation, in so far as the living and spontaneous process of objectification of spirit is understood as production of an inorganic second nature, of a petrified spirit, which living individuals have to introject in the educative process as their internai inorganic nature, until they transform the mechanism of habit into their spontaneous way of acting; • is simultaneously descriptive and criticai, showing on the one hand that individuai powers and soda! institutions cannot be deve!oped and exerdsed unless they assume the characteristics ofimmediacy, spontaneity and irreflexivity proper to mere natural occurrences, and that at this leve! they let themse!ves be described as second nature; but, at the same time, showing that this second naturalness, while operating with necessity in the individuai, is "posited": it is also the product of a contingent process of sodal mediation; • has dialectical structure: second nature is such because it is identical to its opposi te, reflecting some of its traits, since second nature re-presents a form of constraint and necessity that binds the individuai, but, at the same time, is other, because it discloses the possibility of free and criticai acting. Let us, then, define the prindpal characteristics on the basis of which Spirit, as the substance of individuals, acts on them as a second nature: in this way wc can begin to understand in what sense normative!y structured so dal space can have the traits of second naturalness.21 Spiritual substance has the traits of second nature in so far as it: 21. On thevery idea of"social space" in Hegel's Phenome!lologyseeT. Pinkard, Hegel's Phe!lome!lology: lhe Sociality ofReasoll (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Universiry Press, 1994). © Acumen Publishing L,d. 2009 354 ITALOTESTA • acts as nature (has causai power over individuals); • presents itself to the individuaI as mechanism and natural necessity, even though it is the product aiso of spontaneous processes that imply the possibility of deliberation; • immediately exerts a power and an absolute authority over the individual; • immediately operates in a pre-reflexive way in individuals and on individuals as a background even though it is aiso the product of an intentionai and reflexive mediation; • is nevertheless posited, so that its power and authority can be disclosed as the product of a social process, and the destiny with which it manifests itself as an appearance of necessity. 3.1.5 The explicit theory ofHegelian second nature: a survey of the textual passages At this point we need to survey the Hegelian texts in which the notion of"second nature" is explicitly utilized, with particular reference to Elements ofthe Philosophy ofRightand the Encyclopaedia. This will allow us to locate in Hegel's writings the theoretical characteristics of the conception of second nature delineated above. Subsequently, we shali go on to make explicit in terms of second nature some implicit aspects of Hegel's writings ranging from the earliest Jena period to the "Self-consciousness" section of the Phenomenology: this procedure will allow us to broaden our perspective on the problem of zweite Natur and, at the same time, to appraise its connection with Hegel's conceptions of GeistandAnerkennung. 3.1.5.1 Objective second nature and ethicallifè in Elements of the Philosophy of Right In Elements of the Philosophy of Right of 1820 we find the explicit definition of external second nature. Here, according to the predicative use of second nature, it is predicated of ethicallife (Sittlichkeit), in so far as ethicallife to be such has to objectify itself in sodai habits of recognitive interaction stabilized through habit and internalized by individuals. In this way second nature presents itself as a determination of objective spirit and helps us to understand that spirit in generaI is something that is alive, a second Ievel of the naturalness of life. 22 But if it is simply identical with the actuality of individuals, the ethical, as their generaI mode of behavior, appears as custom; and the habit of the ethical appears as a second nature which takes the pIace of the originaI and purely natura! will and is the alI-pervading sou!, significance, and actuality 22. Hegel will call this second lcvcl, t111s potentiated nature, rea more beautiful nature (eine schonere Natur)" (G. W. F. Hege!, 7heorie-Werka"'gabe, E. Moldcnhauer & K. M. Miche! [eds] [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970] [hereafter 7hWA] 9: 537, §376, Zusatz). . © Acwnen Publishing Ltd. 2009 SECOND NATURE ANO RECOGNlTION: HEGELAND THE SOCIAL SPACE 355 of individuai existence. It is spil'it living and present as a world, and only thus does the substance of spirit begin to exist as spirit.'3 Following this use Hegel also qualifìes the institutions of ethicallife, on the basis of the system of right, in tel'ms of second nature. These institutions, in fact, are such that they act upon individuals with the causality of second nature which Hegel, after the Latin, also calls "andere Natur".24 Such institutions in fact present themselves to individuals as an independent and immediately given objective power, albeit produced by historical mediation, and act on them with the effect of ensuring the substantial base of the individuai habits of interaction that make free acting possible. The basis of right is the rea/m ofspil'it in generai and its precise location and point of departure is the will; the will is free, so that freedom constitutes its substance and destiny and the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit produced from within itself as a second nature.25 Hegel shows, moreover, how the ethical substance of social institutions acts on individuals nearly as nature does, presenting itself to them as a sort of natul'al necessity that immediately exercises a power and an absolute authority over them. "In relation to the subject, the ethical substance and its laws and powers are ... an absolute authority and power, infìnitely more fìrmly based than the being of nature". 26 3.1.5.2 Subjective second nature and habit in the Encyclopaedia In the Encyclopaedia, in particular in the section dedicated to ''Anthropology'', the notion of second nature is presented as a determination of subjective spirit, hence in its 23. "Aber in dec einfachcn fdelltiMt mit dec WirkHchkcit dec Individucn crscheint das Sittlichc, als clic allgemeinc Handlungsweise derselben, als Sitte ~ dic Gewohnheit desselben als ciue zweite Nl1tt/Y, die an der Stdle des ersten bloB natiirlichen Willens gesetzt und die durchdringende Sede, Bedeutung und Wirklichkcit ihres Daseins ist, dec als eine Wclt lebendige und vorhandene Gelst, dessen Substanz so erst als Geist ist" (7hWA 7: 301, § 151; Nisbet IZl: 195). 24. "For this habit of[living in] safety has become second nature, and we scarcdy stop to think that it is solely the effcct of panicular institutions [Dann diese Gewohncit dec Sichcrheit ist zur andern Natur geworden, und man denkt nicht gerade nach, wie dies erst clic Wirkung besondcrer Institutioncn sei]" (7hWA 7: 414, §268 Zusatz; Nisbet: 289). 25. "Der Boden des Rechts ist iiberhaupt das Geistige und seine nahere Stelle und Ausgangspunkt dcc Wille, wclcher fi'ci ist, 50 daB clic Freihcit scine Substanz und Bestimmung ausmacht und das Rechtssystem das Reich der verwirklichten Frcilleit, die Wdt des Geistes aus ihm sclbst hervorgebracht, als eine zweite Natur, ist" (7hWA 7: 46, §4; Nisbet: 35). 26. "File das Subjckt hahen dic sittlichc Substanz, ihre Gesetzte und Gcwaltcn ... eine absolutc, unendlich festere Autoritat und Macht als das Seyn der Natur" (7hWA 7: 228, §146; Nisbet: 190). © Acumen Publishing L,d. 2009 356 ITALa TESTA sense ofinternaI second nature, in the context of the discussion of"habit"; "Habit is rightly called a second nature; nature, because it is an immediate being of the soul; a second nature, because it is an immediacy posited by the soul". 27 Here, in the dearest way possible, Hegel shows the logical structure of mediated immediacy as proper to second nature, thus equating first nature with first immediacy and second nature with second immediacy. Although he now considers habit only as a determination of the individuai, it is nevertheless dear that in Hegel's overall conception and this is aIso the novelty in the history of the reception of second nature internai second nature cannot exist without externaI second nature and vice versa. Also in internai second nature, as in the case of ethicaIlife, first nature's appearance of necessity is specularly l!il reflected. Habit can function, and ensure the base of the capacities that make us free, only in so far as it assumes the Force of an automatic mechanism that appears to act necessarily and to exercise an internai dominion over the individuai. Consequentlyalthough, on the one hand, habit makes a man free, yet, on the other hand, it makes him its slave, and though it is not an immediate, first nature dominated by single sensations but rather a second nature posited by soul, yet it is aIl the same a nature, something posited which takes the shape of immediacy, an ideality of what is simply given, which is stili burdened with the form of [mere) being, and consequently something not correspondent to free mind, something merely anthropological.28 It is important to observe how Hegelian zweite Natur reflects features both of the Greek interpretation of physis and of the modern and mechanistic interpretation of nature. In fact, on one hand second nature is predicated of a living individuai who acts spontaneously, but on the other such immediacy also has features of the mechanicity proper to the modern interpretation of nature as an objectified processo The process of formation (Bildung) expressed through the education of individuals is, then, understood by Hegel as the sphere that mediates the dialecticaI relation between externaI and internai second nature. And it is precisely within 27. "Oie Gewohnheit ist mit Rccht cine zweite Natur genannt worden, Natar, dcnn sie ist ein unmittelbares Sein dcc Sede, dne zweite, dcnn sle 1st eiue von dcc Sede gesetzte Unrnittclbarkeit" (Enz.: §410 A; Wallaee/Miller: 141). Scc the Icssons on the philosophy of religion: "Habit, which for IIS has become a second nature [Gcwohnheit, die uns zur zweiten Natur gcworden]" (7hWA 16: 189). 28. "Obgleich daher der Mensch durch dic Gewohnhdt dnerseits frei wird, so maeht mn dieselbe doch andererseits zu ihrem Skaven und 1st dne zwar nicht tmmittelbare. erste, von dcc Einzelheit dcc EmpfÌndungen beherrschte. vielmehr von dcc Sede gesetzte, zweite Nttttlr, aber doch immer eiue Natur, ein clic Gcstalt eines Unmittelbaren annehmendes Gesetztes, dne selber noch mit dcr Form des Seim bchaftete Idea/itiit des Seienden, folglieh ctwas dem frden Geiste Nichtentsprcehcndes, etwas blol!. Anthropowgisches" (Enz.: §41O, Zusatz; Wallaee/Millcr: 144-5). © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 SECOND NATURE AND RECOGNITION: HEGEL AND THE SOCIAL SPACE 357 this process, as we shall see in more detail, that mediation is performed between the mechanical conception of second nature, understood as inorganic nature of the spirit objectified in sodal institutions, and the spontaneous conception of the internai second nature of the Iiving individuai and of Spirito In Bildung, in fact, the socially given second nature of institutions is the presupposition and, at the same time, the result of the individuai process of internalization of the habits of interaction through which spirit as "second nature of the individuai" is formed. 29 Hegel explidtly understands the process of formation (Bildung) whose movement of recognizing constitutes the logical infrastructure as the transition from mere/y animai "first nature" to spiritual "second nature": "Education is the art of making human beings ethical: it considers them as natural beings and shows them how they can be reborn, and how their originai nature can be transformed into a second, spiritual nature so that this spirituality becomes habitual to them". 30 It is precise/y the dialectical character of such transformation whose internai tensions are expressed by the struggle for recognition as a permanent dimension of the interindividual formation of spiri t that defines, on one hand, the tragic character of human history, ever on the verge of falling back into the abyss of objectified first nature, particularly in the fie/d of international re/ations, which for Hege/ never come out of the state of nature. But, then again, this dialectical tension between first and second nature also defines the criticai space of reason, which has the power of disclosing to itself, but not necessarily of dissolving, its constructions' appearance of necessity. 3.2 A renewed vision of the theory of recognition in light of the theory ofsecond nature 3.2.1 From recognition to second nature Up to now we have attempted to shed Iight on the notion of "second nature", supplementing our conceptual analysis with a series of considerations based on lexicography and the history of concepts. This approach was designed to provide some reasons for connecting the theme of zweite Natur to that of Anerkennung at different leve/s. Let us, at this point, state some theoretical conclusions that can be drawn from our previous considerations regarding how Anerkennung has 29. Sec 7hWA 17: 146. 30. "Die Padagogik ist dic KUllSt, dic Menschen sittlich zu machen: sic bctrachtet den Mcnschen als natilrlich, und zeigt den Wcg ihn wiederzugcbarcn, sei ne erste Natur zu eince zwcitcn geistigen umzuwandeln, so daE dieses Gcistige in ihm zur Gewohllheitwird" (7hWA 7: 301, §151, Zusatz; Nisbet: 195). © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 358 ITALOTESTA to be conceived, which will serve as guidelines for our interpretation of Hegel's texts. As a first approximation, it appears we can affirm that: • recognition qua attitude hinges on a recognitive disposition; • the disposition to recognition operates in an immediate and pre-reflexive manner; • the disposition to recognition is nevertheless shaped by a sodal mediation; • the disposition to spiritual recognition is thus conceivable in terms of Aristotelian hexis, that is, of an acquired disposition, a secondary disposition that is formed on the basis of first-nature recognitive functions; • the disposition to spiritual recognition to react to determinate stimuli as to requests, claims to recognition has the form of a second nature (acquired nature), of a mediated immediacy. Such considerations obviously do not rule out the possibility of exerdsing recognition in a reflexive and aware manner. They do indicate, however, that reflexive forms of recognition always presuppose the existence of other pre-reflexive forms of recognition. Moreover, the more that reflexive forms of recognition are exerdsed through practice and repetition, the more they function in an irreflexive way, thereby stabilizing themselves in a second nature: if this were not the case no stable human interaction would be possible, which means that no so dal space would be constituted. From this we can draw the further conclusion that: • recognition constitutes the background of sodal space, the background for which l am disposed, before any belief, to recognize the other as partner in interaction, man, subject, self-consdous being where background indicates the ensemble of capadties, dispositions, abilities, attitudes, prereflexive and proto-intentional practices that allow our reflexive and intentional states to functionY These considerations give us some idea of just how composite, stratified and sedimented this recognitive background is, and what difficulties stand in the way of its theoretical understanding. lf we reflect on the connection between recognitive disposition and Aristotelian hexis philia in particular, understood as a disposition to interaction with other living beings we can pose some important questions on the subject. The disposition to friendship has, in fact, a natural component the dispositions that belong to children and beasts are natural (Et. Nich. VI, 13, 1144b9) and philia is proper also to many ani mais but, at the same 31. On the notion of "background" see J. Searle, 1"e Comtmclion 01 Social Reality (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995; 2nd edn 19%), 133. © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 SECOND NATURE AND RECOGNITION: HEGEL AND THE SOCIAL SPACE 359 time, in man it is an acquired disposition, of a moral type, that presupposes a previous experience of interaction and the possibility of practical deliberation. The Aristotelian idea that there is a merely natural form of philia proper to beasts and chi/dren lets us glimpse the possibi/ity of distinguishing between two levels of recognition, that is, the natural recognition of which we are capable simply as living beings, and the acquired recognition that we develop and become capable of exercising in so far as we form certain habits, since we are educated in a determinate form of life. Hence we can make an analytic distinction between two levels of the recognitive phenomenon which can also consti tute two moments of the same act and whose reciprocal relation varies from context to context namely: • first-nature recognition; • second-nature recognition. 3.3 1he argument ofthe embodiment of Anerkennung and ofSpirit 3.3.1 The argument in the Phenomenology A this point we wish to legitimize our reconstruction of Anerkennung in terms of second nature historically by briefly showing that it has a basis in the systematic argument underlying the pages on "Independence and dependence of self-consciousness (Selbstdndigkeit und Unselbstdndigkeit des Selbstbewusstsein)" , developed by Hegel in the sections on "Self-consciousness" and "Reason". In fact, Hegel's generaI argument seems to be in support ofhis thesis that just as the independence of self-consciousness cannot be achieved without the recognition of its recognitive dependence on other self-consciousnesses, so the autonomy of Reason in generaI cannot be achieved without the recognition ofits dependence on natural and social being. In this respect the sections on Self-consciousness and Reason seem intended to show the fai/ure of any dualistic understanding of the relation between reason and society, reason and history, reason and nature, whi/e simultaneously making a case for the embodiment of reason in individuai and social nature: where this embodiment is precisely the process of formation of what we have called internaI and external second nature.32 The "life and death struggle" too, which follows the analysis of the pure concept of recognition, follows the same line of argument. In fact the pointe of the analysis consists in showing that the attempt by the self-consciousnesses to assert their own autonomy by annulling any link with naturallife is destined to 32. On this concept of"embodiment" see a1so J. Russon, 7be Self tlnd Its Body in Hegels Phenomenology ofSpirit (Toranto: University ofToranto Press, 1997), 14. © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 360 ITALO TESTA produce a profound distortion. The lesson to be drawn from the life and death struggle is that for the desiring consciousness "life is as essential to it as pure se!f-consciousness (dajJ ihm das Leben so wesentlich als das reine SelbstbewujJtsein ist)" (PhdG: 112; MilIer: 115). Se!f-consciousness, while not identical to mere animallife, is not a pure disembodied spirit either. Rather, it tends to deve!op as potentiated life: it tends to acquire a second leve! of subjective and objective naturalness in which "comprehended life (aujgefojJtes Leben)"33 expresses both necessity and freedom. Where se!f-consciousness is not capable of perceiving the second-nature aspect of itse!f and of other consciousnesses it is not capable of achieving a perfected recognition: it treats living being as a dead thing, as mere mechanical first nature, and is not capable of recognizing its "universal inorganic nature". On the one hand desiring se!f-consciousnesses are already part of the movement of recognizing, and thus, in a certain sense, in the mere state of nature already have recognitive capacities, without which they would not be at alI capable of coordinating their conflictual interaction. On the other hand the first-nature recognitive capacities they have at their disposal are stili minimally deve!oped and in Hege!'s design tend to be fulfilled at a higher leve!. If, in fact, the recognitive capacities and the re!ations to which they give rise did not come to be embodied in an internai and social second nature, re!ations between individuals would permanent!y have the Hobbesian structure of a life and death struggle and could not give rise to any social space. From this standpoint the conceptuallink between the theory of Anerkennung and the question of second nature invests the very conceivability of a human social space: if recognition were to be comprehended with the categories of reciprocal interaction alone according to a methodologically individualistic approach as is the case in many contemporary formulations then such a mode! would in no way be capable of accounting for the structure of social space, since it would lack the conceptual resources to understand how it is possible for men to free themse!ves of recognitive conflict. 3.3.2 Begierde and the second-nature mechanism of habit: on the re!ation between the Phenomenology and the Encyclopaedia In the deve!opment of our argumentation, at this point it is decisive to show the type of correspondence that subsists between the notion of Begierde considered in the Phenomenology and the section of the Encyclopaedia in which Hege! deals most explicit!y with the theme of second nature. In this way we think it is possible to justify both theoretically and textually an interpretation of the phenomenological theory of recognition in terms of the dialectic of second nature. 33. The notion of"comprchcnded life [a"fkefofftes Leben]", undcrstood as potentiated nature second nature, according to QUI interpretation goes back to Hcgel's Frankfurt writings: see G. W. F. Hcgcl, Hegels 7heologische]lIgendschriften, H. Nohl (ed.) (TUbingen: Mohr, 1907),307. © Acumen Publishing Led. 2009 SECONO NATURE ANO RECOGNITION: HEGEL ANO THE SOCIAL SPACE 361 Begierde represents a type of animai consciousness, of self-consciousness stili immersed and sunken in naturalness, whose structural presuppositions Hegel makes explicit in the section of Subjective Spirit dedicated to "Anthropology", and further develops in the successive section, "Phenomenology", which begins with a compendium of the "Consciousness" and "Self-consciousness" sections of his 1807 work. The "Anthropology" section of the Encyclopaedia, in fact, is concerned with immediate subjective spirit, which Hegel understands as "soul or natural spirit (Seele oder Naturgeist)" (Enz.: §387). The activities through which the soul develops are "sensibility (Empjindung)", "feeling (Ge.fohO" and "self-feeling (Selbstge.fohO". We thus have a consciousness that moves in the state of nature with a pre-reHexive form of self-relation and a practical orientation in me environment. This self-feeling is characterized as a "particular embodiment (ein besondere Verleiblichung)" (§408) and williater present itselfin Hegel's treatment of self-consciousness within the struggle for recognition as the self-feeling of corporeal self-consciousness.34 The body, seen as a vital manifestation of selfconsciousness and ics expressive sign, is precisely that which is affected by the furrher activity of the soul, namely "habit (Gewohnheit)". Habit is understood here as a mode of natural existence (§409) since it possesses the non-reHexive immediacy and the spontaneity of natural functions that is nevertheless the precipitate of an activity through which corporeal dispositions are shaped and modified, through repetition and practice, until they form "aptitudes, or skills (Geschicklichkeit)" that function as "mechanisrns of the intelligence (Mechanismus der Intelligenz)": a "second nature", as Hegel affìrrns with indirect reference to Cicero (De jinibus bonorum et malorum V, 25, 74). Here it is interesting to note that habit as internai second nature is sornething that for Hegel can already be formed in living organisrns that are stili imrnersed in a first-nature environment, devoid of ethica! institutions and complex forrns of sociality: thus, for example, Hegel understands the upright posture of man as second-nature habit. From this standpoint, as we said, the relation between first and second nature is Huid and is never a clear-cut opposition. 1hen again, it is aIso clear that for Hegel the distinctive character of the second nature proper to human social space consists precisely in that reciprocal mediation between individuai habit and social institutions which is lacking in merely animai forms of life. In the third piace it is important to note the strategic meaning of Hegel's statement that "the form of habit applies to ali kinds and grades of the activity of Spirit (die F01m del' Gewohnheit umfoft alle Arten und Stufen der Ttitigkeit des Geistes)" (Enz.: §401A; WaIlace: 34. "But this immcdiacy is at the samc time the corporeity of self-consciousness, in which as in its sign and tool the lattee has its own seme ofself, and its beingfor others, and the means for entering into relation with them [Aber diese Unmittelbarkcit isr zuglcich die Leiblichkeit des Selbsrbewufltseins, in welcher es als in seinem Zeichcn und Wcrkzcug selll eignes Selbstgefiih/ und sein Sein fiir andere, und seine es mit ihnen vermittelnde Beziehung hat]" (Enz.: §431: Wallace: 171). © Acwnen Publishing Ltd. 2009 362 ITALO TESTA 142). In the ''Anthropology'' section, in fact, Hegel, while taking his distance from sensualism, nevertheless iIIustrates in his way a genealogy of spirit based on its natural conditions. Within this reconstruction he shows not only that Spirit emerges from nature, but also that its high levels of development continue to have nature as their condition and therefore do not exist independently of it. 35 The theory of habit and thus the theOlY of internaI second nature is, indeed, the decisive junction for formulating the conception on the basis of which alI properly so-called spiritual activities from upright posture to the higher faculties of consciousness and reflexive self-consciousness not only presuppose for their content the corporeal constitution of determinate aptitudes bur are also accompanied at alI levels by the form of second-nature immediacy. From the standpoint of that which we could calI the argument 01 the necessary embodiment 01 Spirit, also the cogito implies the body and its habituation and can thus be qualified as having the immediate form of a second nature for the individuaI. Habit, understood as "mechanism of self-feeling (Mechanism des Selbstgefohls)" (Enz.: §410A), thus provides the basis for the existence of the ''1'' as a thinking being whose constitution is mediated by recognition's movement of duplication.36 This, in its turn, requires an expressive conception of the body, understood 35. A reading in this sense, rcgarding the rdation between saul and body. has also been proposed by Michael WoIff, Dm Kiirper-Seele-Problem: Kommentar ztJ Hegel, Enzyklopiidie §389 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, [1830] 1992). For a differcnt reading of second nature in the context of the systematic reladon between Nature and Spirit in the Encyc!opedid. see C. Halbig, "Varieties of Nature in Hegel and McOowell", Europea1/JollrllalofPhilosophy 14(2) (2006), 222-41. Then again, Alfredo Ferrarin, in his remarkable essay Hegel {/1/d Aristotle (Cambridge: Canlbridge University Press, 200 l), reads the Hegelian theory of habit within an intcrpretation that postulates a clear-cut discontinuity between nature and spirir: rhe process through which spirir returns ro itselffrom rhe exreriority of nature is, for him, nothing other rhan a movement of idealization in which nature must be negated and die if it is to be able to give Iife to spirit (ibid.: 237-8). In this Iight Ferrarin for whom the Aristotelian element of the Hegelian conception of spiri t is fundamentally derived from a neo-Platonic component sees the formation of habirs as a unilateral process of rupture with the corporeity in which nature ceases to be an external 'givell and becomes an ideai possession of spirit (ibid.: 278ff.). lr must, however, be nored that the process of idealization in Hegel is always accompanicd as, indeed, the theory of habit attests by a complementary movement of cmbodiment: in this respect, habit is Ilot just the activity that "produces spontaneity in receptivity" (ibid.: 280), but 1s also the moment in which spontaneous activities are embodied in second-nature receptivity. The dualistic readings of the relation between nature and spirir in Hegel spring. in my opinion, precisely [rom the tendency te neglect this second aspect and to accentuate unilarcrally in the idealist-subjective sense the mament of idealization. 36. "Thinking. roo, however free and active in ics own pure element it becomes, no less rcquires habit and familiarilY (tilis impromptuity 121 or form of immediacy), by which it is the property of my singlc sclf where I can freely and in ali directions range. It is through this habit rhat I come to realize my existence as a thinking being. Even here, in this spontaneity of sclf-cenrred thought, there is a partnership of soul and body (hence, want of habit and too-Iong-continued thinking cause headache); habit diminishes this feeling. by making the naturai function an immediacy of the souI [Das ganz freie, in dem reinen Elemente seiner selbst tatige Denkell bedarf ebenfalls der © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 SECOND NATURE ANO RECOGNITION: HEGEL ANO THE SOCIAL SPACE 363 not as mere Korpe/~ a mechanical object, but rather as Leib, the living body that is the means of our expressive self-relation (Enz.: §41l). For Hegel, with this it finally becomes possible to recondle the andent sense of internal second nature as living spontaneity and the modern sense of external second nature understood as inorganic mechanism.37 4. The sodal space of second nature revisited At this point we wish to examine some possible consequences of the conception of second nature we have attempted to reconstruct in Hegel's texts for the comprehension of sodal space, particularly in relation to the post-Sellars interpretation of the space of reasons developed by neo-Hegelianism in the Pittsburgh School. First of all, according to our reading: Gcwohnhcit und GeHiufigkeit, dieser Fonn der U1l1nittelbtlrkeit, wodurch es ungchindcrtes, durchgcdrungcncs Eigentum meines einze/llen Selbst ist. Erst durch diese Gcwohnhcit existiel't! Ich. als denkendes fiir mieh. Selbst diese Unrnittelbarkeit des denkcndcn Bci-sieh-scins enthalt Leiblichkeit (Ungewohnheit und lange Fortsetzung des Denkcns macht Kopfweh), die Gewohheit vcrmindert diese EmpSndung. indem sie die natiirliche Bestimmung zu eince Unrnittelbarkcit dec Seele macht]" (Enz.: §410A; Wallace: 143). 37. The genetie analysis of clIC cvolution of spidt as process in which conscientialll.ill and soda! structures emerge from nature is a philosophical reconstruction rhar Hegel set against different systcmatic backgrowlds in the various phases of his thought: in 1803-4 nature is understood phenomenologically as Anderssein (otherness)" of spiriti in 1804-5 Andersseill is llnderstood as thc logical essence of nature understood as AuJSereinnndersein (asunderness Ul1 separatencss)j 1Ìnally, in the ElIcycloptleditl, spirit ancl nature will be undcrstood systematically as modcs of the Idea Aujersichsein (self-externality) and Fiirsichsein (being-for-self). 1he alternation of these clifferent meta-theoretical conceptions, however, did not modify the Hegelian reconstruction of the natura! genesis of spirito It appears to me, then, that this genealogy does Ilot depend in its internai structure ~ or in its historicaI gencsis either 011 the systematic framework adopted from one time to the next. For this reason the Hegelian reconstruction has, in my opinion, al1 argumentative potential that lends itself to being re-actualized even in different theoretical contexts, which would continue to be valid even if in the end contrary to my expectations the traditional reading of the systematie conception of nature as idea in its otherness should prove COrrect: me reading for whieh, in the final analysis, this conception dcpcnds on a spiritualistic ontology that reduccs nature to something insubstantial and always already spiritualized. Presenting a non-traditional, alternative account of the meaning of the systematic conception of nature is, unquestionably, a complex task that I cannot carry out here. I do be1ieve, however, that this analysis of tbe natural gcncsis of spirit and of second nature, with its valorization of the constitutive valuc of crnbodiment (Verleiblichung) for all mc Illornents of spiritual devcloprnent, can provide at least some rcasons for not being wUling to take the traditional interpretation for granted. In this directioIl, moreover, one ought to explore the possibility of extending the recognitive reconstruction of subjective and objectivc spirit in such a wayas to account for absolute spirit in terrns of a meta-philosophy of recognition which, as such, ought, in rny opinion, to be reconstructcd by valorizing the function of scepticisrn for a comprehension of the recognitivc structure of the absolutc as a rclation of opposites. © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 364 ITALOTESTA • the Jena writings, the Phenomenology, the Encyclopaedia and the Elements 01 the Philosophy 01 Right converge in the joint argument of the necessary expressive embodiment 01 Spirit or of the necessary second-nature objectification 01 recognition. The thesis that habit is the universal form of Spirit requires, in fact, that Spirit have its manifestation in corporeal expressivity. The theory of second nature, in its dual subjective and objective aspect, aIso requires a dual aspect of embodimento In fact, it is not only the forms of individuai intentionality but aIso the forms of collective intentionality that manifest themselves in interindividual spiritual relations of a recognitive type that will have to be embodied in habits. If this were not the case, then life and death struggle would be the only possible form of relation between individuals. Spirit will have to be embodied both in the organic body of individuals and in the inorganic body of institutions. But then again, aIso sodal and institutional bodies ethical substance are not something merely artifidal but manifest a certain continuity with nature in so far as they present the form of a sodal second nature, which has the stabilized configuration of the mechanism of habit, sedimented in so dal practices, and which acts on individuals with a first-nature appearance of necessity. What consequences stem from this approach for the way in which we ought to conceive the relation between reason and so dal space? Reason comes to be understood in the Hegelian framework as manifestation of spiritual activity, in particular as the perfected manifestation of the relational structure of selfconsdousness. Thus: • reason has of itself an interindividual structure, in so far as its content and its form are posited through relations of recognition that institute the relational structure of self-consdousness; • the intersubjective structure of reason is, then, intrinsically sodal in so far as, on the basis of the embodiment argument, relations of self-recognition and of recognition of others self-consdousness and its duplication cannot be phantasmatic and disembodied but must be embodied in individuai and in so dal and institutional bodies; • the so dal structure of reason is ali the more strengthened by the dialectical mediation between objective and subjective second nature that is characteristic of institutionalized human sodety, in which institutional sodal bo dies become more and more the external second-nature condition of the formation of the internai second nature of individuai spiritual habits; • the so dal space of reason, Spirit, is not another type of entity added to natural ones, but rather an expressive reconfiguration of the relations subsisting between natural bcings. The sodality of reason has, for that matter, a natural genesis, in so far as spiritual recognitive relations have time and again © Acumcn Publishing Ltd. 2009 SECONO NATURE ANO RECOGNITION: HEGELANO THE SOCIAL SPACE 365 to emerge dia!ectica!ly, and not without tensions, from natural recognitive relations. Also for Hegel man is in a sense more complex than Aristotle's but nevertheless in agreement with it a naturally soda! animaI. Hegel's legacy even in light of the necessary distance dictated by the passing of time does not cease to pose certain desiderata with respect ro the contemporary demand to rethink the soda! space of reason, in particular as regards the necessity of not giving rise to an abstract, disembodied vision that postulates a dear-cut discontinuity between nature and spirito It thus appears necessary to arrive with respect to the normativistic conception that usually accompanies Sellars's formula of the space of reasons at a deeper mediation of the relation between the natura! component and the normative component of spirito From this standpoint the demand, noted by John McDowell, to overcome the dua!ism between a natura!istic conception ofknowledge as the exerdse of natural capadties and a sodal conception ofknowledge as normative status appears fully compatible with the basic idea of Hegelian argumentation.38 Nevertheless, this demand cannot be satisfÌed in the least as long as the notion of second nature is limited as occurs in McDowell to the interna! second nature of individuals and thus to the organic sense of second nature, and is not extended to inorganic externa! soda! nature, since in this way we lose sight of the very mechanism that renders the space of rationa!ity intimately sodal and confers upon soda! rules both normative power and causa! efficacy over individua!s. Neither can the demand be satisfÌed if as again occurs in McDowellthe connection between the sodality of space and the recognitive constitution of self-consdousness is not made explidt: in fact, if this passage is omitted one cannot but remai n bound to a subjective conception of self-consdousness and thus of the space of reason.39 In this way the space of reasons remains a Platonic normative space but do es not become a sodal space. Robert Brandom has thematized the recognitive and soda! structure of rationality and its objective dimension in a more convindng manner.40 Nevertheless, also Brandom fails to satisf)r the demand posed by the Hegelian conception in so far as he ends up understanding normativity in radically constructivist terms, thus postulating a dear discontinuity between nature and culture:41 and this is due in the fina! ana!ysis to the fact that his reconstruc38. Scc McDowell, Mind t/nd World, 86. 39. Exemplary in this respect is McDowcll, ibid. 40. On the "objective') side of recognition see Brandom, "Some Pragmatist 1hemes in Hegel's Idealism". On its "absolute" ~ that is, logicalsidc, sec his "Holism and Idealism in Hcgcl's Phenomenology"} in his Tales of the Mighty Det/d: Historict/l Esst/ys in the Mettlphysics of Intmtiont/lity, 178-209 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Prcss, 2003). 41. See for cxarnplc R. B. Brandom, Articult/ting Remons: An Introd/lction to Inftrentit/lism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Prcss, 2000), 26--7, 33. © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 366 ITALO TESTA tion of the theory of recognition, at least in the first phase of his interpretation of Hegel, fails to grasp the relation between the naturallevel and the spiritual level of recognition and thus its connection with the question of second nature and of habit. fu a resulr, Brandom tends to equate the structure of recognition with that of normatively structured discursiviry, understood as the dimension that separates human creatures form other natural creatures, and ends up losing sight of the thickness of the Hegelian notion of Anerkennung, which does have an important dimension in language but cannot be reduced to it. It is not fortuitous that Hegel, in his lessons on the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803--4, was already intent on showing the Iimits of discursive language, maintaining that in it there is no "real recognition (reales Anerkennung)": both the dialectical process and the normative structure of recognition are thus located for Hegel at a deeper level of discursive exchange. A1so the new model of recognition later presented by Brandom,42 broaching a distinction between simple recognition and robust recognition, appears capable of tackling the problems posed by the previous modelwhich had been developed solely in terms of a normative pragmatics of recognitive attribution only in so far as it is detached from the discontinuistic vision of the relation between natural dispositions and secondary cultural dispositions of a normative type, reaffirmed by Brandom with his c1aim that "self-conscious beings don't have natures, they have histories" .43 If this condition is dropped, the distinction between simple recognition and robust recognition ought in my view to be reinterpreted in Iight of the Hegelian distinction between natural recognition and spiritual recognition; but this task cannot be performed unless one simultaneously e1aborates a vision of the relation between first and second nature. The theory of second nature, in this respect, would be that through which the otherwise unexplained parenthesis contained in Brandom's c1aim that human beings are "(partially) self-constituting creatures" could be made comprehensible. The partiality of such constitution is due to the fact that we are not simply creatures who "have histories" but rather are creatures who have a double-edged constitution, both historical and natura!, resulting from the dialectical and contingent interweaving that operates from time to time between first and second nature, between natural and spiritual recognition. 42. See R. B. Brandom, "Selbsbcwusstsein und Selbst-Konstitution", in Hegels Erbe, C. Halbig, M. Quante & L. Siep (cds), 46--77 (Frankfurt: Subrkamp, 2004). 43. See ibid., 47. © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 SECONO NATURE ANO RECOGNITION: HEGEL ANO THE SOCIAL SPACE 367 5. Towards a phenomenology of contemporary so dal space In conclusion I would like to remark briefly on a question that connects from a different perspective the theme I have discussed with the problem of understanding the sodal space of reasons. A theory of recognition revisited through a theory of second nature ought to make a contribution not only to the problem ofbringing a theoretical mode! of the so dal space of reasons into focus but also to the problem of interpreting contemporary sodal space in this light. Naturally this is a vast undertaking that I can barely hint at here. 5.1 A problem in the interpretation 01 contemporary sodal space The conception of the so dal space of reasons of a Hegelian matrix appears to meet with a number of problems in presenting itse!f as a mode! for understanding the current situation. Such problems appear to stem from two main causes: • the unavoidable t:'lct of the plurality of forms of ethicallife; • exhaustion of the belief that our form of ethicallife is the only one that can make a claim to be rationa!. In the presence of these conditions the virtuous circle between internal second nature and external second nature their condliation that the mode! demands as a condition of the ethical stabilization of recognitive relations is no longer a fait accompli within the borders of the National State. Nor can we any longer be readily assured that our second-nature habits are good habits. Thus the first-nature anomie of the global space of international relations, which in the Hegelian conception was modelled on the state of nature of a struggle for permanent recognition without ethical stabilization, now appears to invest the very second naturalness of the so dal space of national communities. 5.2 Post-Hegelian conceptual resources for tackling the problem In light of the problem posed it would appear opportune to begin to reconsider some aspects of the Hege!ian theory of national and global so dal space. We do not believe, however, that this situation means the theory of second nature must be abandoned, even though the hope that it can give rise to a no longer revocable stabilization of our form of life has been dashed. In the theory of second nature, in fact, conceptual resources are available that can help us deal with several particular aspects of contemporaneity. In this respect: © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 368 ITALO TESTA • the Hegelian discovery of the dialectical character of second nature, radica!ized by the school of suspidon and by the critique of ideology (Nietzsche, Lukacs, Adorno) in terms of the paradoxicality of the re!ation between first and second nature,« can provide a mode! of epochal diagnosis for the analysis of the phenomena of sodal fragmentation typical of our time. The revisited theory of recognition is thus also a gateway for these conceptual resources, at least in so far as an interpretation of the re!ation between the two leve!s of recognition in terms of a problematical co-presence rather than of a chronologica! succession according to a fresh reading of the Kampf um Anerkennung appears to be inseparable from that phenomenon of instability of the second nature which reveals itse!f in some aspects of contemporary soda! fragmentation. Italo Testa is Aggregate Professor ofHistory ofPolitical Philosophy at the University ofParma and Visiting Professor for History ofPhilosophy at the Ci Foscari Univesity ofVenice. He is author of Hegel critico e scettico (2002), Riconoscimento naturale e autocoscienza sociale (2002) and Teorie dell'argomentazione (2006), and co-editor of Ragionevoli dubbi (2001), Hegel contemporaneo (2003), Hegel e le scienze sociali (2005) and Lo spazio sociale delh ragione (2009). He is a1so co-erlitor of the collection of classics on individualism and solidarism "La ginestri' (Diabasis Press). References Adorno, T. W. 1932. "Die Idee der Naturgeschichte". In Gesammelte Schriften, voI. l, R. Tiedemann (ed.), 345-65. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Brandom, R. B. 1999. "Some Pragmatisr 1l,emes in Hegel's Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel's Account of the Structure and Content ofConceptual Norms". Europeall founlal ofPhilosophy 7(2): 164-89. Reprinted in his Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical S,ay' iII the MeMphy,ic, of Intentionality, 210-34 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). Brandom, R. B. 2000. Articullltillg Remo",: An Introductioll to Inforentiali,m. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Presso Brandom, R. B. 2003. "Holism and Idealism in Hcgcl's Phenomenology". In his Tales ofthe Mighty Dead: Historical Ssay' in the Metaphy,ic, of Intentionality, 178-209. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Presso Brandom, R. B. 2004. "Selbsbewusstsein und Selbst-KonstitutiOli'. In Hegels Erbe, C. Halbig. M. Quante & L. Siep (eds), 46-77. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Ferradn, A. 200 l. Hegel alld Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Presso Fichte, J. G. [1804] 1991. Die Grundziige des gegemviirtigen Zeitalters. In his Gesamtau,gabe der Bayerischen Akademie der WissellSchaften, voI. l, 811M, R. Lauth & H. Gliwitzky (eds), 189-396. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog. 44. See T. W. Adorno, "Die Idee der Naturgeschichte", in Gesammelte Schriften, voI. l, R. Tiedemann (cd.), 345-65 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1932). © Acumen Publishing L,d. 2009 SECOND NATURE AND RECOGNITION: HEGELAND THE SOCIAL SPACE 369 Fichte, J. G. [1794] 1962. De Offidis Emditorum. Einige Vorlestmgen iiber die Bestimm,mg des Gelehrten. In his GesarllffltlSgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der WissetlSehaften, voI. I, 3, lLll, R. Lauth & H. Jacob (eds), 25-68. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog. Frank, M. 1993. "Wider den aprioristischen Intersubjektivismus". In Gemeimchaft ,md Gereehtigkeit, M. Brwnlik & H. Brunkhorst (eds), 273-89. Frankfurt: Fischer. Funke, G. 1984. "Natur, zweite (I)". In Historisches WOrterbuch der Phi/osophie, voI. 6, 484-9. Basel: Schwabe. Habermas, J. 1999. Withrheit ,md Rechtftrtig,mg: Phi/osophische Allfiiitze, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Published in English as lhlfh andjllstification, 1til (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). Habermas, J. 2005. Zwischen Natllra/ismtlS ,md Re/igion: Phi/osophische Allfiiitze. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Halbig, C. 2006. "Varieties ofNature in Hegel and McDowell". EllropeanjollrnalofPhi/osophy 14(2): 222--41. Hegel, G. W. F. 1907. Hegels lheologischejllgendschriften, H. Nohl (cd.). Tilbingen: Mohr. Hegel, G. W. F. 1970. 1heorie-WerkfltISgabe, E. Moldenhauer & K. M. Michel (eds). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp [ThWA]. Hegel, G. W. F. 1980. Phiinomen%giedes Geistes, W. Bonsiepen & R. Heede (eds). In Gesammelte Werke, voI. 9. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Published in English as HegeH Phenomen%gy ofSpirit, A. V. Miller (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) [PhdG]. Hegel, G. W. F. [1830]1992. Enzyk/opiidiederphi/osophischen Wissemchaften im Gmndrisse, W. Bonsiepen & H.-C. Lucas (eds). Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Published in English as Hegels Philosophy of Mind, W. Wallace &A. V. Miller (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) [Enz.]. Henrich, D. 1970. "SelbstbewuBtsein: kritische Einleitung in eine 111corie". In Hermeneutik ,md Dia/ektik, I, R. Bubner (ed.), 257-84. Tubingen: Mohr. Henrich, D. 1989. "Noch cinmal in Zirkeln. Eine Kritik von Ernst Tugendhats semantischer ErkJ:irung von Selbstbewusstsein". In Mensch ,md Moderne, C. Bellut & U. Milller-Scilhll (eds), 93-132. Wlirzburg: K6nigshauscn & Neumann. Honneth, A. 1992. Kampf 'I1n Anerken1ltl1lg: ZlIr moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Published in English as The Struggle for Recognition: 1he Moral Grammar of Sodal Conflicts, J. Anderson (trans.) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). Honneth, A. 1994. Desintegration: Bruchstikke einer soziologischen Zeitdiagnose. Frankfurt: Fischer Lukics, G. 1920. Die lheorie des Romans: Ein gesehichtsphilosophiseher Vers1lch iiber die Formm der grossen Epik. Berlin: Pau! Cassirer (reprinted: Frankfurt: Luchterhand, 1989). Published in English as 1he lheory ofthe Novel, A. Bostock (trans.) (London: Merlin, 1971). Macbeth, D. 2008. "Un'antinomia nel giudizio empirico: Brandom c McDowell". In Lo spazio sociale del/II ragione, L. Ruggiu & I. Testa (eds), 1l5l. Milan: Guerini. McDowell, J. 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (2nd edu, 1996). McDowell, J. 2004. "Sclbstbestimmende Subjektivitat und externer Zwang". In Hegels Erbe, C. Halbig, M. Quante & L. Sicp (eds), 184-208. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Nictzsche, F. [1874] 1966. Vom Niitzen ,md Nachteil der Historie fiir dm Leben. In Werke, voI. I, V. K. Schlechta (cd.). Munich: Hans. Pinkard, T. 1994. Hegels Phenomen%gy: 111e SocialityofReflSon. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Presso Pippin, R. B. 1999. "Naturalness ,md Mindedness: Hegel's Compatibilism". Ellropean journal of Philosophy 7(2): 194-212. Pippin, R. B. 2000. "What is the Question for which Hegel's Theory of Recognition is the Answer?" E1Iropean jOllrnal ofPhi/osophy 8(2): 155-72. Plppin, R. B. 2003. "Hegel e la razionalità istituzionale". In Rege! contemporaneo: La ricezione america di Hegel a COllfrOlltO COli/II tl'fldiziolle europea, L. Ruggiu & I. Testa (eds), 97-128. Milan: Guerini. Rath, N. 1984. "Natur, zweite (II)". In Ristorisehes WOrterbllch der Philosophie, voI. 6, 489-94. Basel: Schwabe. © Acumen Publishing Ltd. 2009 370 ITALO TESTA Rath, N. 1996. Zweite Natur: Konzepte einer Vermittltmg von Natur lmd Kullur in Antropologie lmd Asthelik 11111 1800. Miinster: Waxmann. Russon, J. 1997. 711e SeI[ and Iis Body in HegelS Phenomenology of Spirito Toronto: University of Toronto Presso Seade, J. 1995. 7he Comtmction ofSoeial Reality. Harmondsworth: Penguin (2nd eM 1996). Sellars, W. [1956] 1997. Empiricism and Ihe Philosophy ofMimi, IVith an Introduction by R. Rorty and a Sludy Guide by R. Brandom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Presso Testa, L 2001. l'Riconoscimento naturalizzato: Una soluzione scettica al dibattito sull'autocoscienza tra Henrich, Tugendhat e Habermas". In Ragionevoli dubbi. La critica sociale tra tmiversa/ismo e sceps;, p. Costa, M. Rosati & l. Testa (eds), 67-90. Rome: Carocci. Testa, I. 2002. Riconoscimento naturale e autocoscienza sociale: RicoSh'uz;onc e ripresa della teoria hegelifllltt del/'Allerkenmmg, dissertatioIl, Università Ca' Foscari, Venice! Reprinted as Riconoscimento IM!tlrale e mondo sociale (Milan: Guerini, 2009). Testa, I. 2005. "Naturalmente sociali: Per una teoria generale del riconoscimento". In Hegel e le scienze sociali, A. Bellan & l. Testa (eds), Quaderni di Teoria Sociale 8: 165-218. Testa, I. 2007. "Criticism from within Nature: The Dialectic betwccn First and Second Nature from McOowell to Adorno". Philosophy and Social Criticism 33(3): 473-97. Wolfl; M. [1830] 1992. Das Kihper-Seele-Problem: Kommelllar ZII Hegel, Ellzyklopiìdie §389. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann. © Acumen Publishing Ltd.